Glazer v. Fireman\u27s Fund by United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 Case No. 1:11-cv-04374-PGG 
---------------------------------------------X COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, 
- against - 
FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
HAROLD FOWLKES, Individually, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS 
A TRIAL BY JURY 
---------------------------------------------X 
Plaintiff, by her attorneys, PHILLIPS & PHILLIPS, Attorneys at Law, 
PLLC, hereby complains of the Defendants, upon information and belief, as follows: 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
1. Plaintiff complains pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (amended in 1972, 1978 and by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (“Title VII”), and the New York City Human Rights Law, 
New York City Administrative Code § 8-107 et. seq. (“NYCHRL”), and seeks damages 
to redress the injuries Plaintiff has suffered as a result of being discriminated against, 
retaliated against, and ultimately terminated by her employer due to her religion 
(Judaism). 
2. Plaintiff was also retaliated against by her employer for complaining of widespread and
rampant discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII and the 
NYCHRL. 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. Jurisdiction of this Court is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), 
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 
4. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of Plaintiff brought under state 
law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
5. Defendants maintain sufficient contacts with the Southern District of New York to make 
venue appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
 
PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES 
4. On or about February 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination upon which this 
Complaint is based with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”). 
5. On or about March 30, 2011, the EEOC issued a letter of determination, in which it stated 
that, “based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the Commission has 
determined there is reasonable cause to believe that Charging Party was terminated 
by Respondent on the basis of her religion . . . There is reasonable cause to believe 
Charging Party was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment, and 
was terminated by Respondent on the basis of her religion, in violation of Title VII.” 
6. Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC, dated May 26, 2011, with 
respect to the herein charges of discrimination.  A copy of the Notice is annexed hereto. 
7. This Action is being commenced within 90 days of receipt of said Right to Sue. 
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PARTIES 
8. That at all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff   (“ is a resident of 
the State of New York and County of Nassau. 
9. Plaintiff is a 43-year-old Caucasian Jewish woman. 
10. That at all times relevant hereto, Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE 
COMPANY (“FIREMAN’S FUND”) was and is a foreign business corporation, with its 
corporate headquarters located at 777 San Marin Dr., Novato, CA 94998. 
11. That at all times relevant hereto, Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND maintains offices within 
the State of New York, located at One Chase Manhattan Plaza, 37
th
 Floor, New York, 
New York 10005. 
12. That at all times relevant hereto, Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND is owned and managed 
by Allianz SE, headquartered in Munich, Germany. 
13. That at all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff  was an employee of Defendant 
FIREMAN’S FUND. 
14. That at all times relevant hereto, Defendant HAROLD FOWLKES (“FOWLKES”) was 
and is a resident of the State of New York. 
15. Defendant FOWLKES is an African-American Christian man. 
16. That at all times relevant hereto, Defendant FOWLKES was and is an employee of 
Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND. 
17. That at all times relevant hereto, Defendant FOWLKES held the position of “Vice 
President, Northeast Region” at Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND.  
18. That at all times relevant hereto, Defendant FOWLKES was Plaintiff 
supervisor and/or held supervisory authority over Plaintiff  
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19. Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND and Defendant FOWLKES are collectively referred to 
herein as “Defendants.” 
 
MATERIAL FACTS 
20. On or about February 4, 2008, Plaintiff began working for Defendant 
FIREMAN’S FUND as an “Underwriter Specialist.” 
21. Plaintiff earned $140,000 per year in salary plus additional benefits at the time of 
termination. 
22. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff  was an exemplary employee. 
23. From on or about February 4, 2008 through on or about October 3, 2008, Plaintiff 
always received compliments for her work performance, was never 
reprimanded, and got along well with all of her co-workers. 
24. In fact, as a result of her experience and excellent performance, on or about February 
12, 2008, Plaintiff received a promotion to the position of  “Specialty Field 
Underwriting Director,” where she was responsible for managing two branch offices in 
New York City and Long Island, twelve employees, $45,000,000 in written premium, and 
approximately 250 broker relationships. 
25. Furthermore, in or about mid-July 2008, Plaintiff received a positive 
performance evaluation from Defendant FOWLKES, in which he stated that Plaintiff 
was “doing a good job refocusing her team and that 2008 was going to be a 
rebuilding year and to gear up for a better 2009.” 
26. During this same meeting, Defendant FOWLKES specifically told Plaintiff 
that, “if you don’t hear from me, then everything is OK.”  As Plaintiff hardly 
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ever heard from Defendant FOWLKES, she took this to mean that there were no 
complaints with regard to her performance. 
 
Discrimination and Retaliation on the Basis of Religion 
27. However, everything changed after Plaintiff  took time off to observe the Jewish 
High Holidays, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. 
28. Upon learning that Plaintiff  was Jewish, Defendant FOWLKES 
immediately changed his attitude and started to treat Plaintiff  completely 
differently than he did before. 
29. On or about September 15, 2008, Plaintiff notified Defendant FOWLKES and 
his assistant, Margaret Concepcion, that she would be out of the office on September 30, 
2008 and October 1, 2008 to observe the Jewish High Holiday of Rosh Hashanah, and 
would be leaving at 3:30 pm on October 8, 2008 and would be out on October 9, 2009 to 
observe the Jewish High Holiday of Yom Kippur. 
30. Rather strangely, on or about September 23, 2008, only one week later, Defendant 
FOWLKES requested that Plaintiff  specifically meet with him on the morning 
of September 30, 2008. 
31. When Plaintiff reminded him that she would be out for Rosh Hashanah, he then asked to 
meet with her during the afternoon of September 20, 2008, which she again reminded him 
would not work because she would be out the entire day. 
32. Completely ignoring Plaintiff religious beliefs, Defendant FOWLKES 
proceeded to ask her if she could meet on October 1, 2008. 
33. Confused and perplexed, Plaintiff  again reminded him that she would still be 
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observing Rosh Hashanah and would not be returning until October 3, 2008. 
34. On or about October 3, 2008, upon returning from Rosh Hashanah, Plaintiff 
met with Defendant FOWLKES and immediately noticed that Defendant 
FOWLKES’ entire attitude and demeanor toward Plaintiff changed and 
was completely different than before she took off for Rosh Hashanah. 
35. By way of example, Defendant FOWLKES was much more forceful with Plaintiff 
and cursed significantly more at her, as if he was angry with Plaintiff  
for observing the Jewish holidays.  
36. Specifically on one occasion after taking her religious holiday during a conversation 
relating to “agency management planning” Defendant FOWLKES said he “(Defendant 
 “I don’t give a fuck what your team thinks this is what I want to 
fucking do, and that’s what they are going to fucking do, if they don’t want to 
fucking do it, I will fire every last fucking one of them”. 
37. Defendant FOWLKES would not even look at Plaintiff and acknowledge her 
presence when they were in meetings or other company functions due to her religion.  
38. Plaintiff  also started to realize that Defendant FOWLKES was treating her 
completely different than he treated all the other employees who were not Jewish. 
39. It was clear and apparent that Defendant FOWLKES was treating Plaintiff 
differently solely due to her religion, as no other non-Jewish employee experienced 
the same issues upon returning from a religious holiday. 
40. Later that same day, on or about October 3, 2008, Plaintiff feelings and 
beliefs were only reinforced when Defendant FOWLKES randomly sent her an email, 
which began, “  I just realized that I had this email in draft and did not send it to 
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you.” 
41. In this email, Defendant FOWLKES arbitrarily accused Plaintiff  of taking extra 
long lunches with a subordinate.  These allegations were completely false and 
fabricated. 
42. Defendant FOWLKES only accused Plaintiff  of taking long lunches with 
a subordinate because she took off for the Jewish holidays, as Defendant 
FOWLKES never even reprimanded Plaintiff  before she left to observe 
the Jewish holidays. 
43. It appeared to Plaintiff that Defendant FOWLKES was starting to 
fabricate evidence as a way to set Plaintiff up for termination. 
44. However, Plaintiff  was apprehensive to report Defendant FOWLKES’ 
discriminatory and unlawful behavior out of fear of losing her job. 
45. Although she was nervous to do so, on or about October 8, 2008, Plaintiff met 
with Defendant FOWLKES to remind him that she would be observing Yom Kippur 
starting that evening, her Blackberry would be off, and she would be returning on October 
10, 2008. 
46. On or about October 10, 2008, when Plaintiff returned to the office after Yom 
Kippur, she received an email from Defendant FOWLKES that he had emailed her the 
day before, on or about October 9, 2008, asking that Plaintiff get back to him 
ASAP.  This was rather suspicious, as Plaintiff had personally spoken to 
Defendant FOWLKES only one day earlier, and reminded him that she would be 
observing Yom Kippur, and therefore would not have access to email. 
47. This was merely another obvious attempt to single out Plaintiff  and 
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reprimand her for frivolous reasons solely because she was Jewish and observed the 
Jewish holidays. 
48. As such, Plaintiff asked Defendant FOWLKES to give her a couple of days to 
get back to him since she was out of the office and needed to catch up, to which he 
replied, “No problem.” 
49. On or about October 15, 2008, Plaintiff  met with Defendant FOWLKES in his 
office and answered each of the questions he posed in his October 9, 2008 email.  
Defendant FOWLKES never mentioned during this meeting that there were any 
problems with Plaintiff work performance. 
50. Although Plaintiff  had already answered all of his questions during their 
meeting, the next day, on or about October 16, 2008, Defendant FOWLKES awkwardly 
sent Plaintiff  a mean-spirited email demanding that Plaintiff  
immediately get back to him regarding his requests.  This was clearly solely done in 
retaliation for observing the Jewish holidays, as Defendant FOWLKES never acted 
in this fashion towards Plaintiff  before she took off for the Jewish 
holidays. 
51. Plaintiff was flabbergasted by the difference in the way Defendant FOWLKES 
treated a Jewish employee compared to the way he treated non-Jewish employees. 
52. Nevertheless, on or about October 17, 2008, Plaintiff sent a very detailed email 
to Defendant FOWLKES reiterating everything that was discussed at their October 15, 
2008 meeting.  Plaintiff  never received any response to this email. 
53. On or about October 22, 2008, Plaintiff sent Defendant FOWLKES an email 
with an updated Agency/Broker Plan, which was three days ahead of schedule.  Plaintiff 
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never received any response to this email. 
54. On or about October 30, 2008, at Defendant FOWLKES’ request, Plaintiff sent 
an email to Defendant FOWLKES advising him of the progress of three newly hired 
employees.  Plaintiff never received any response to this email. 
55. On or about November 6, 2008, without any warning, Plaintiff 
employment was suddenly terminated for “not doing her job.” 
56. This was certainly religious discrimination, as Plaintiff  was never once told 
that she was “not doing her job” prior to being suddenly terminated. 
57. This reason is undoubtedly pretext, as Defendants have yet to provide Plaintiff  
with any evidence or further explanation regarding the reason for her termination. 
58. Plaintiff felt offended, disturbed, and humiliated by the blatantly unlawful and 
discriminatory termination. 
59. Defendant FOWLKES did not like the fact that Plaintiff was Jewish, and 
thus began a discriminatory campaign against her, ultimately ending with the 
termination of her employment. 
 
Discrimination and Retaliation on the Basis of Race 
60. During her tenure with Defendants, Plaintiff also observed numerous acts that 
she believed constituted discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, Defendant 
FOWLKES treated African Americans better than non-African Americans. 
61. Plaintiff first learned of Defendant FOWLKES racially discriminatory ways on 
or about February 20, 2008, after two excellent Underwriters in Plaintiff 
group, a Caucasian male and a Caucasian female, both gave notice that they were 
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resigning due to being underpaid. 
62. More specifically, Defendant FOWLKES refused to give them both salary increases or 
promotions commensurate with their experience, although their prior manager, Jeannette 
Wise Mantel, also a Caucasian female, tried very hard to get them both raises and 
promotions. 
63. On or about March 10, 2008, Plaintiff  learned that Beverly McGill, an African-
American female, received the largest raise and bonus in the department for no apparent 
reason. 
64. To make matters worse, while Defendant FOWLKES refused to give any of the 
Caucasian employees salary increases or promotions, on or about April 14, 2008, he 
instructed Plaintiff  to go to Human Resources and request that Ms. McGill’s 
salary be increased again by $10,000.  While Ms. McGill was not the most experienced 
or most successful Underwriter in the department, she was now the highest paid 
Underwriter in the department. 
65. Moreover, although the aforementioned procedure normally takes at least three weeks, 
Defendant FOWLKES made sure to get Ms. McGill’s salary increase approved within 
four days. 
66. In or about late June 2008, Defendant FOWLKES hired Franz Beague, an African-
American man, as an Underwriting Specialist in Plaintiff  group, with a salary 
of $125,000, making Mr. Beague the highest paid Underwriter in Plaintiff  
group with the next highest being Ms. McGill, also African-American. 
67. Quite suspiciously, although Mr. Beague was hired to work in Plaintiff 
group, Defendant FOWLKES unilaterally hired Mr. Beague without consulting with 
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Plaintiff  without advising Plaintiff  that he was looking for another 
Underwriter and without telling Plaintiff  that he made Mr. Beague a job offer. 
68. In fact, Plaintiff never met Mr. Beague until after Defendant FOWLKES had 
already hired him. 
69. As a result, in or about late June 2008, Plaintiff visited Defendant 
FOWLKES and complained that the salaries of Caucasian employees were all 
significantly less than the salaries of similarly situated African-American employees. 
70. Defendant FOWLKES wholly ignored Plaintiff  complaint of discrimination 
and on or about November 6, 2008, without any warning, Plaintiff  
employment was suddenly terminated for “not doing her job.” 
71. The above are just some of the acts of harassment, discrimination and retaliation that 
Plaintiff  experienced on a regular and continual basis while employed by 
Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND. 
72. On or about November 6, 2008, Plaintiff was terminated from her position 
with Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND on the basis of her religion, for exercising her 
religious rights, and for complaining of race-based discrimination. 
73. Defendants treated Plaintiff  different solely because she was Jewish, 
observed the Jewish holidays, and complained about race-based discrimination. 
74. But for the fact that the Plaintiff was Jewish, observed the Jewish High 
Holidays, and complained of race-based discrimination, Defendants would not have 
treated her different and would not have terminated her employment. 
75. Defendant FIREMAN’S FUND had knowledge of and/or acquiesced in the 
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation of Plaintiff  
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76. Plaintiff has been unlawfully discriminated against, was humiliated, retaliated against, has 
been degraded and belittled; and as a result suffers loss of rights, emotional distress, loss of 
income, earnings and physical injury.  
77. Plaintiff’s performance was, and is, upon information and belief, above average during the 
course of employment with the Defendants.  
78. Defendants’ actions and conduct were intentional and intended to harm the Plaintiff. 
79. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff feels extremely humiliated, degraded, 
victimized, embarrassed, and emotionally distressed.    
80. As a result of the acts and conduct complained of herein, Plaintiff has suffered a loss of 
income, the loss of a salary, bonus, benefits, and other compensation which such 
employment entails, and Plaintiff has also suffered future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, 
suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses.  
Plaintiff has further experienced severe emotional and physical distress.  
81. As a result of the above, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount which exceeds the 
jurisdiction limits of the Court.  
82. Defendants’ conduct has been malicious, willful, outrageous, and conducted with full 
knowledge of the law.  As such, the Plaintiff demands Punitive Damages as against all 
Defendants, jointly and severally.  
 
AS A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
(Not Against Individual Defendant) 
83. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of 
this complaint. 
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84. This claim is authorized and instituted pursuant to the provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 2000e et seq., for relief based upon the unlawful 
employment practices of the above-named Defendants.  Plaintiff complains of 
Defendants’ violation of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in employment 
based, in whole or in part, upon an employee’s religion and/or race.  
85. Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §2000e et 
seq., by discriminating against Plaintiff because of her religion and race. 
 
AS A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
(Not Against Individual Defendant) 
86. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of 
this complaint. 
87. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) provides 
that it shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
"(1) to . . . discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [s]he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 
 
88. Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practice prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §2000e et 
seq. by discriminating against Plaintiff with respect to the terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment because of her opposition to the unlawful employment practices of 
Defendants. 
AS A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
89. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation made in the above 
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paragraphs of this Complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length. 
90. The Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] provides that “It shall be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of 
the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital 
status, sexual orientation or alienage or citizenship status of any person, to refuse to hire 
or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or to discriminate 
against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment.”  
91. Defendants engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of New York City 
Administrative Code Title 8, §8-107(1)(a) by creating and maintaining discriminatory 
working conditions, and otherwise discriminating against Plaintiff because of her religion 
and race. 
 
AS A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
92. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation made in the above 
paragraphs of this Complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length. 
93. The New York City Administrative Code Title 8, §8-107(6) provides that it shall be 
unlawful discriminatory practice: “For any person to aid, abet, incite, compel; or coerce 
the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter, or attempt to do so.”  
94. Defendants engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of New York City 
Administrative Code Title 8, §8-107(6) by aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling and 
coercing the above discriminatory, unlawful and retaliatory conduct. 
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AS A FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
95. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation made in the above 
paragraphs of this Complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length. 
96. The New York City Administrative Code Title 8, §8-107(7) provides that it shall be 
unlawful discriminatory practice: “For an employer . . . to discharge . . . or otherwise 
discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any practices forbidden 
under this chapter. . .” 
97. Each of the Defendants engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of 
New York City Administrative Code Title 8, §8-107(7) by discriminating against Plaintiff 
because of Plaintiff’s opposition to the unlawful employment practices of Plaintiff’s 
employer.  
 
AS A SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
98. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation made in the above 
paragraphs of this Complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length. 
99. New York City Administrative Code Title 8-107(19) Interference with protected rights. It 
shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten 
or interfere with, or attempt to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with, any person in 
the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any 
other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected pursuant to 
this section. 
100. Defendants violated the section cited herein as set forth. 
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AS A SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
101. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation made in the above 
paragraphs of this Complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length. 
102. New York City Administrative Code Title 8-107(13) Employer liability for 
discriminatory conduct by employee, agent or independent contractor.  
a. An employer shall be liable for an unlawful discriminatory practice based upon 
the conduct of an employee or agent which is in violation of any provision of this 
section other than subdivisions one and two of this section.  
b. An employer shall be liable for an unlawful discriminatory practice based upon 
the conduct of an employee or agent which is in violation of subdivision one or 
two of this section only where: 
1. the employee or agent exercised managerial or supervisory 
responsibility; or 
2.  the employer knew of the employee’s or agent’s discriminatory 
conduct, and acquiesced in such conduct or failed to take immediate 
and appropriate corrective action; an employer shall be deemed to 
have knowledge of an employee’s or agent’s discriminatory conduct 
where that conduct was known by another employee or agent who 
exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility; or 
3.  the employer should have known of the employee’s or agent’s 
discriminatory conduct and failed to exercise reasonable diligence to 
prevent such discriminatory conduct. 
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c. An employer shall be liable for an unlawful discriminatory practice committed   
by a person employed as an independent contractor, other than an agent of such 
employer, to carry out work in furtherance of the employer’s business enterprise 
only where such discriminatory conduct was committed in the course of such 
employment and the employer had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in such 
conduct. 
100. Defendants violated the section cited herein as set forth. 
INJURY AND DAMAGES 
101. As a result of the acts and conduct complained of herein, Plaintiff has suffered and will 
continue to suffer the loss of a career and the loss of a salary, bonuses, benefits and other 
compensation which such employment entails, out-of-pocket medical expenses and 
Plaintiff has also suffered future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, injury to her reputation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary 
losses.  Plaintiff has further experienced severe emotional and physical distress. 
 
JURY DEMAND 
102. Plaintiff  demands a trial by jury. 
 
 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests a judgment against the Defendants: 
A. Declaring that Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practice prohibited by Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq. and The New York 
City Administrative Code, §8-107 et. seq., and that Defendants discriminated against, and 
retaliated against, Plaintiff on the basis of her religion and race; 
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B. Awarding damages to Plaintiff for all lost wages and benefits resulting from Defendants’ 
unlawful discrimination and retaliation and to otherwise make her whole for any losses 
suffered as a result of such unlawful employment practice; 
C. Awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages for mental, emotional and physical injury, 
distress, pain and suffering and injury to her reputation in an amount to be proven; 
D. Awarding Plaintiff punitive damages; 
E. Awarding Plaintiff attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the prosecution of the 
action; 
F. Awarding Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court may deem equitable, just and 
proper to remedy the Defendants’ unlawful employment practices. 
 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally in an 
amount to be determined at the time of trial plus interest, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, 
costs, and disbursements of action; and for such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 15, 2011 
 
 
PHILLIPS & PHILLIPS, 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PLLC 
 
___________/s/__________________ 
William K. Phillips, Esq. (WP0409) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
30 Broad Street, 35
th
 Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
(212) 587-0760 
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